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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
"IN REM" MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge v. O'Brien' required the
court to characterize the juridical nature of a so-called "in rem" mort-
gage or pledge. The defendant gave the plaintiff a note that stipulated
it was secured by the pledge of a limited partnership interest that was
to be "the sole and absolute security" for its payment. 2 The court found
that the provision, in light of the circumstances under which it had
been negotiated, evidenced an agreement that the maker's obligation was
to be "in rem only"-"excluding any personal liability" on his part.
The argument was then made that without a personal obligation there
could be no pledge since pledge is an accessory contract that may not
exist without a principal obligation.
The court noted that the supreme court had recognized the validity
of the so called "in rem" mortgages, "even though no personal liability
exists as to the mortgagor." 3 It then considered whether there may be
"in rem" pledges as well as "in rem" mortgages and concluded that,
because of the similarity of pledge and mortgage, there is no reason to
differentiate the two in this respect. This conclusion, although accurate,
misses the point. All mortgages and pledges are by their nature "in
rem," if by that one means that no other responsibility for satisfaction
of the principal obligation rests upon the mortgagor or pledgor by virtue
of his contract and that each creates a real right over the property to
have it sold and the proceeds applied to satisfy the obligation it secures. 4
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 439 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 443 So. 2d 590 (La. 1983).
2. The court considered two questions concerning the validity of the pledge of the
partnership interest. The first was whether notice of the pledge to the "obligor" of the
interest (presumably the partnership) was required by Civil Code Article 3158 to effectuate
it between the parties. The other question was whether the absence of "personal" liability
rendered it invalid for lack of a principal obligation. As to the first question, the court
properly held that such notice is only required to affect third persons. The parties apparently
did not question, and the court did not consider, whether a "partnership interest" can
be pledged by a mere agreement between the parties, without something more to evidence
or effect a delivery. It is by no means certain that article 3158 regulates the pledge of
such interests. Futhermore, the article requires delivery of "the written obligation" evi-
dencing the pledged obligation as a condition of the pledge under its provisions.
3. Keene v. Williams, 423 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1982); Kavanaugh v. Berkett, 407 So.
2d 645 (La. 1981); Tennant v. Caffery, 163 La. 976, 113 So. 167 (1927); Shexnailder v.
Fontenot, 147 La. 467, 85 So. 207 (1920).
4. It is obvious from the opinion as a whole that the court viewed its statement
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At the same time, it is axiomatic that such security exists only to
guarantee performance of another distinct obligation of the debtor and
that the secured party has no right to resort to the security except to
satisfy that obligation. In fact, absent a prior confession of judgment
on the principal obligation or special agreement of sale in the case of
a pledge, the creditor has no avenue by which he can proceed against
the security unless he first obtains a judgment against the principal
obligor -on the principal obligation.
The question raised by the so called "in rem" mortgage (or pledge)
does not concern the nature of the obligation created by the security,
which is fixed by law. Rather, it requires a determination of the effect
of an agreement by a creditor that he will satisfy the debt only out of
certain property upon the default of the debtor. A distinct contract of
mortgage or pledge of the property is customarily given to assure the
creditor that the property out of which the debt is to be satisfied will
in fact be available to him. There is no logical reason, however, why
such an agreement requires it be secured by an accessory contract of
mortgage or pledge.
The court primarily relied upon the authority of decisions of the
supreme court recognizing the validity of mortgages given in such cases.
It also approved the analysis of Professor Max Nathan in an article on
the subject in which he concludes that while such an agreement does
not give rise to a personal obligation, neither does it require denial of
the accessorial nature of the mortgage (or pledge) securing it for the
following reasons:
If C loans D $25,000 which is repayable only out of specified
assets, there is a "duty" to repay the $25,000, even though not
all of D's estate is obligated to repay it. Whether the correlative
aspect of C's right to be repaid the $25,000 which he has
advanced is called a "duty" or an "obligation" or a "debt",
it seems perfectly apparent that C is entitled to be repaid. And
it appears naive to contend that the correlative aspects of that
right are not in the nature of a debt or obligation. In any event,
the transaction is patently "some engagement" within the terms
of Articles 3290 of the Code even if it does not give rise to a
personal obligation or debt. Article 3290 defines mortgage in
terms of securing "the execution of some engagement", and it
that the pledge was intended to be in rem only and without personal liability by the
pledgor as meaning that the obligations of the pledgor were restricted to those of the
contract of pledge and that the reference to a lack of "personal liability" was viewed as
being synonomous with a lack of a "personal obligation" for the debt. The common
law has wrestled with the problem of the nature of such arrangements, although from a
quite different perspective. See G. Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages § 156
(2d ed. 1970).
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strains semantics to belabor distinctions between duty, obligation,
debt and "some engagement". In other words, unless C intends
the $25,000 as a gift to D, there is a duty to repay. That duty
to repay should suffice as a principal obligation and ought to
be sufficient to support an accessorial obligation. . . .Viewed
liberally, from the backdrop of commercial and practical desir-
ability, the in rem mortgage can easily be upheld on the basis
that there is a principal indebtedness satisfying the accessory
obligation principle . . . In addition the principal obligation,
the duty to repay, can be analogized to a natural obligation,
so that it is considered binding on the obliger, but not actionable
on the part of the obligee.5
The court thus concluded, "there is a real 'debt' in both [the in
rem mortgage and pledge] sufficient to support an accessory obligation
whether or not that 'debt' involves personal liability." '6
The conclusion is correct. A proper analysis of the arrangement,
however, does not require denial of the existence of a "personal"
obligation of the debtor in such a case, apart from the mortgage or
pledge, nor that it is different in its other aspects from that which
would exist in absence of the agreement limiting liability, as is suggested
by the court and Professor Nathan.
Contracts limiting a debtor's liability to the existence of specific
property or funds are quite common and may essentially take one of
two forms that frequently employ similar terminology for their expression
but are quite different in theory and effect. In the first type of contract
the parties agree the debt will be paid only if certain funds are received
by the debtor. For example, a sale of movables may provide the price
will be payable "only out of" revenues derived from the rental of the
property which the buyer is to effectuate. This gives rise to an obligation
subject to a suspensive condition. 7 The debtor has no obligation to pay
unless the funds are received. In all other respects, however, the re-
sponsibility of the debtor to perform is unlimited. The seller is given
no right in the proceeds, but when the buyer receives them his obligation
to pay an equivalent amount to the seller becomes fixed. If he fails to
do so, the seller has his action for the amount owed. If the parties
secure the obligation by a pledge of the revenues to be received it might
also superficially appear that the purchaser has no "personal" liability.
Such is, in fact, not the case because the principal obligation exists,
5. Nathan, The In Rem Mortgage, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 497, 509, 512-13 (1970).
6. 439 So. 2d at 558.
7. Breaux v. Lauve, 24 La. Ann. 179 (1872); Roehl v. Porteous, 47 La. Ann. 1582,
18 So. 645 (1895); Pertuit v. Weinberg, 134 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Dales
Jewelers, Inc. v. Rice, 316 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
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the suspensive condition is fulfilled as the rents are paid, and the debt
is extinguished as they are received by the pledgee. If for some reason
the pledge is invalid it will not affect the purchaser's obligation to pay
what he owes.
The other kind of arrangement is the one under consideration. The
debtor agrees to perform an obligation. The creditor agrees he will only
"look to" or "satisfy the debt out of" certain property of the debtor
or certain security given to him for it. This also implicitly recognizes
that there must be a default by the debtor before resort is had to the
property and distinguishes this arrangement from the first.
Some modern continental theorists have postulated that an obligation
can be separated into two distinct elements: the duty of the obligor to
perform and his liability for failing to do so. Professor Litvinoff in his
treatise on Obligations observes in this connection:
Nowadays, the duty to render a certain prestation and the li-
ability-or prejudice imposed on the defaulting debtor such as
execution on his property-appear together as forming one single
unit; but it has not always been so. These two elements, ac-
cording to the dualist theory, operated originally in an inde-
pendent way. In the. ancient law of Rome, as in the primitive
law of other peoples, an obligation did not automatically entail
liability. For this to emerge, the execution of another and dif-
ferent act was necessary. In the case of a contract, for instance
another act, or agreement, ought to be added to the original
promise, clearly specifying the liability to be incurred in case
of nonperformance.'
Professor Litvinoff also notes that while this is probably an
accurate analysis of some earlier legal systems, the two concepts cannot
be as completely differentiated today as they were in ancient law because
they have largely become fused in contemporary thought. An "obli-
gation," as that term is now generally understood encompasses both
aspects of the obligor's relationship to the obligee. It is difficult to
conceive of an obligation totally without sanctions, nor of sanctions in
the absence of an obligation. At the same time the two concepts have
not become so integrated that the content of one necessarily defines the
other. In this connection, Professor Litvinoff observes: "In sum, it can
be said that, according to prevailing contemporary doctrine, the sepa-
ration of duty and liability as two independent elements is a helpful
device for the task of clarifying concepts, although its scope of appli-
cation is somewhat reduced." 9 Then, in discussing situations in which
the analytical model still has utility, he notes:
8. I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 51, at 72, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
9. Id. § 55 at 79-80.
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Another instance of the separation of the two elements has been
found in situations where the duties entail only a limited liability,
that is, where only some and not all of the debtor's property
is intended to serve as satisfaction for the right of the creditor.
But such a case, says an Italian writer, does not differ from
any other where the debtor owes an amount that exceeds the
value of his property, and neither of these situations is apt to
impair the traditional concept of obligation as in both of them
a true and proper legal relation attended by a sanction can be
noticed. In other words, any limitation, in fact or in law, of
the liability still shows that the two elements can be distinguished,
but it does not prove that they can be separated.' 0
One might add to the above comment: neither does a limitation
upon the obligor's liability for default require denial of the existence
of the obligation or render it intrinsically different in nature. The civil
code itself supports the finding that the two elements are not so inex-
tricably entwined as to dictate the conclusion that an "ordinary" personal
obligation no longer exists where the parties have contractually agreed
the creditor will limit his recourse against the debtor to certain property
for its satisfaction.
The newly adopted revision of the Title on Obligations provides in
new articles 1756 and 1758:
Art. 1756. Obligations; definition. An obligation is a legal re-
lationship whereby a person called the obligor is bound to render
a performance in favor of another called the obligee. Perform-
ance may consist of giving, doing or not doing something.
Art. 1758. General Effects. An obligation may give the obligee
the right to:
(1) Enforce the performance that the obligor is bound to
render;
(2) Enforce performance by causing it to render by another
at the obligor's expense
(3) Recover damages for the obligors failure to perform on
his defective perfomance., (Emphasis added).
Civil Code article 3182 in the title "Of Privileges" declares:
Whoever has bound himself personally is obligated to fulfill his
engagement out of all of his property, movable and immovable,
present and future.
10. Id. at 79.
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The location of this article in the code demonstrates it is not intended
to define the nature of a "personal" obligation but rather to prescribe
one method by which the obligee may ordinarily enforce it. The article
is limited by its terms to those who "have bound themselves personally."
It does not however declare or imply that personal obligations may not
exist without its application, or even that their existence in all cases
carries with it those consequences. Nor has it ever been assumed that
the existence of a "personal" obligation is dependent upon unlimited
recourse to the obligor's patrimony." The law itself recognizes numerous
situations in which a debt exists, but the creditors' right of recourse is
limited to certain parts of the debtor's property-as where an heir accepts
a succession with benefit of inventory; a debtor is granted a discharge
in bankruptcy having property over which a creditor has security; a suit
is instituted against property of a person outside the jurisdiction of the
court; part of the debtor's property is declared exempt from seizure
and so forth. The courts have never held that such restrictions upon
the creditor's right of recourse changes the intrinsic nature of the debtor's
obligation.
Viewed from this perspective agreements of the type under consid-
eration are merely contractual modifications of the provisions of article
3182. The creditor has agreed-to use the terms of the article-that his
debtor, who has bound himself personally, is not obligated to fulfill
the obligation out of his general patrimony but only from designated
or specified portions of it.
It only creates obscurity and confusion to postulate that no "per-
sonal" obligation exists in such a case or, more importantly, that the
"obligation," "debt," or "duty" as it has been variously referred to
by the court is of a different nature than it would otherwise be. Surely
no one would contend the debtor could recover sums he had paid on
the debt because he did not owe it. Is it not an indispensable allegation
of the creditor's petition in a case such as that under consideration that
a sum is owed for the satisfaction of which the property should be
sold? Is the debtor prohibited from pleading in defense of the action
an extinction of the obligation by payment, prescription, or some other
cause or that it is not binding upon him because of error, fraud, mistake
or lack of consideration independently of the validity of a distinct
contract of mortgage or pledge given by him to secure it?
The real danger of the court's analysis that the mortgage is in rem
and that the obligor is not personally liable to the creditor although
some sort of "duty" or "natural" obligation to pay exists that "sup-
11. The obligation of fidelity in a marriage is certainly a personal obligation of the
parties who contract it. The breach of the obligation may permit dissolution of the bond,
but it is hard to see how it can give rise to recourse to the patrimony of the obligor.
Injunctive relief or specific performance is frequently granted in a variety of situations
where no pecuniary liability may exist for the obligor's breach.
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ports" the mortgage is that it implies that the "duty" or obligation is
a unique or distinct one that may be subject to rules or principles
different from those that would be applicable if the debtor were "per-
sonally" liable. There is no reason to hold that the debtor and creditor
have not entered into whatever type contract they have agreed to with
the normal consequences attendant to such an obligation, except as it
has been conventionally modified, directly or by implication, by limiting
the creditor's right to pursue the debtors general patrimony.1 2
RETROACTIVITY OF PLEDGES AND MORTGAGES UNDER CIVIL CODE
ARTICLE 3158
One of the well known characteristics of the so-called collateral
mortgage is that it is deemed to come into existence only when the note
it secures is issued in pledge to the prospective mortgagee. If the pledge
is extinguished by surrender to the pledgor of the mortgage note, the
mortgage is extinguished but may later be given vitality as a new mort-
gage if the note is again reissued in pledge by its maker. If the pledge
is extinguished the mere fact that the note is left in the hands of the
former pledgee does not give continued vitality to the mortgage. A new
or additional pledge in such a case is considered technically a new
issuance of the note, "revitalizing" the mortgage that becomes effective
only at that time. Civil Code article 3158, which regulates the restros-
pective effect to be given pledges that secure future obligations, has
been held to inferentially regulate the effectiveness of the mortgage
securing a note intended to be issued in pledge. Civil Code article 2645
provides that the transfer or assignment of a principal obligation im-
plicitly includes an assignment of the security that is accessory to it.
These rules sometimes require a practictioner to take into account
rather subtle distinctions if he wishes to maintain the security for an
obligation upon its transfer, as is illustrated by two cases decided last
year. In the first case, New Orleans Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Lee,'3 a bank loaned $100,000 to a customer secured by the pledge
12. If a mortgage is given to secure a note containing such a stipulation and suit is
brought 6 years after maturity, a plea of prescription of the debt-the note-should be
valid. There would also appear to be no reason why an agreement of the kind under
consideration could not be made when the obligation is for something other than the
payment of money. A lessee might pledge bonds "as sole security and exclusive recourse
for performance of the obligations of the lease." If he failed to make repairs called for
by the lease or to restore the leased premises to their former condition at its termination,
a question might be raised as to whether the limitation comprehended such breaches. If
a court concluded it was so intended, would it then hold no contract of lease existed
because the lessee was not "personally bound" upon it? Could the lessee get an injunction
to prevent those breaches? Could he dissolve the lease instead of resorting to an action
to execute on the pledged property? More importantly, is not the answer to these questions
one of interpreting the import of the agreement of the parties under their contract of
lease rather than postulating that no such contract exists?
13. 449 So. 2d 1099 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
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of his $150,000 collateral mortgage note. A judicial mortgage second
in rank to the collateral mortgage was later obtained by the defendant.
The plaintiff association, apparently as a part of its overall financing
arrangements with the customer, thereafter paid the customers' balance
to the bank. The bank marked both the so called "hand" note evidencing
the principal obligation and the pledge agreement as "paid" and delivered
the collateral mortgage note and the "paid" hand note to the plaintiff.
The customer apparently had agreed that the collateral mortgage note
would secure the plaintiff's loan to him, the proceeds of which were
used to pay the loan of the bank. The plaintiff association argued that
the priority of the bank's mortgage was maintained by the physical
transfer of the collateral mortgage note and its repledge by the customer
to secure repayment of the money the plaintiff had advanced. The court
observed that while an assignment of the principal obligation would
have carried with it the accessory pledge of the mortgage note, the facts
revealed that an extinction of the obligation by payment had taken place.
It then properly held that the transaction was equivalent to a surrender
and reissuance in pledge of the collateral note by the maker, so that
the mortgage, which had been extinguished by payment of his debt and
surrender of the mortgage note, was revived upon repledge of the note
but became second in rank to the judicial mortgage. The result is
obviously correct, and indeed, the case is factually indistinguishable from
the earlier case of Odom vs. Cherokee Homes, Inc.14 in 1964. The
plaintiff's admission that the note was repledged to it to secure a new
loan it had made to the customer was intrinsically fatal to its case.
The language of article 3158 is quite confusing, redundant, and to
some degree inconsistent. The relevant part of the article, stripped of
some of its excess verbiage and with certain bracketed additions to
facilitate its consideration, reads as follows:
Whenever a pledge of any instrument or item of the kind listed
in this article is made [1] to secure a particular loan or debt,
or to secure advances to be made up to a certain amount and
[2] if so desired or provided to secure any other obligations of
the pledgor to the pledgee then existing or thereafter arising,
up to . . . the limit of the pledge and [3] the pledged instrument
or item remains . . . in the hands of the pledgee, [Then] the
item may . . . be repledged to secure at any time any . .
renewals of the original loan . . . or any new . . . loans . . .
even though the original loan . . . has been reduced or paid, up
to the total limits which it was agreed should be secured . . . and
if so.desired or provided to secure any other obligations... without
any added penalty . . . and the pledge shall be valid against third
persons... to the same extent as if they [the additional obligations]
came into existence when the . . . item was originally pledged. . ..
14. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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The provisions of the article under consideration were added by
Act 290 of 1952. They were obviously designed to extend the rights of
a pledgee by giving a pledge retrospective effect in situations where such
might not otherwise have been the case. Pledges to secure "future
obligations" have been in common usage for many years. The accessorial
nature of the pledge however, caused doubts as to whether the privilege
of the pledgee in such cases arose at the time of the agreement of
pledge and delivery of the property or only when the later debt was
incurred. This was particularly true if a period elapsed when nothing
was owed to the creditor, as where the debts first incurred were paid
and new ones were then negotiated.
It is obvious that the principal thrust of the amendment was to
make it clear that a pledge given for future obligations could relate
back to an earlier time. The terms of article 3158 appear to require at
least three conditions for such retrospectivity as is indicated by the
bracketed additions made to the article above. The pledge must be made
to secure "a particular loan or debt, or . . . advances to be made;"
the item pledged must "remain in the hands of the pledgee" and "it
must be desired" or "provided" that other or future obligations will
be secured by the pledge. 5 If these conditions are met, the pledge for
such other or future debts relates back to the date the property was
"originally" pledged.
If this is a proper interpretation of the article then the earliest time
to which such a pledge has retrospective effect as to a particular ob-
ligation is the time at which there is a concurrence of all of the following
conditions:
First: When there was an agreement that the particular obligation
would be secured by the pledge. If a pledge is only given to secure an
existing obligation, and the pledgor thereafter incurs another obligation
to the creditor, no pledge exists for the latter absent an additional
agreement to that effect by the pledgor.16 Neither can it be said that it
was "so desired or provided" that the future debt would be secured
when the item was first delivered in pledge as the clause numbered [3]
appears to require. Similarly, if the first obligation is satisfied before
the second is incurred the "pledgee" would simply be holding the pledged
item as a custodian during the interim, not as a pledgee. A new and
independent agreement of pledge securing the second obligation would
be just that, having effect only from the day of the second agreement.
15. At least one of the courts of appeal has expressly recognized that these require-
ments are a condition of the application of the articles. See New Orleans Silversmiths,
Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
16. Lepow v. Walker Land Co., 352 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); People's
Bank & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 374 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 376
So. 2d 1268 (La. 1979); Romero v. Newman, 50 La. Ann. 80, 23 So. 493 (1898); Herber
v. Thompson, 47 La. Ann. 800, 17 So. 318 (1895); Teutonia Nat'l Bank v. Loeb, 27
La. Ann. 110 (1875).
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Second: The time the pledged item was last delivered in pledge to
the pledgee. It is of the essence of pledge that delivery occur.1 7 Pledge
is a form of real contract. The agreement of pledge does not create a
right of possession in the pledgee or privilege over the property until
delivery is effected. The requirement that the item "remain in the hands
of the pledgee," as will be more fully discussed later, should not be
interpreted to mean that the pledgee must have continuous physical
detention of the thing, but rather that the pledge must have been
perfected by delivery and not extinguished by the surrender of the
pledgee's right of possession to the pledgor. Is
Third: The time the item was first pledged to secure "a particular
loan or debt or . . . advances to be made." This is perhaps the most
confusing part of the clause since it apparently requires one to distinguish
these kinds of obligations from "other obligations" thereafter incurred
that the parties must apparently "provide" or "desire" to be secured.
Viewing Act 290 of 1952 in light of its history and obvious purpose,
it would appear that the phrase "whenever a pledge . . . is made to
secure a particular debt, or to secure advances to be made" was intended
to fix the starting point of the pledgee's rights as the time a pledge
relationship is first established, and that this is to be determined from
existing principles without resort to the restrospective features extended
to "future" obligations by the amendment. Otherwise, why would the
clause have been required? If this is correct, then the earliest time a
pledge securing "future advances" can be retrospectively valid is the
time the pledgee can demonstrate he enjoyed a pledge for some other
obligation without relying upon the retrospective provisions of the article.
This would certainly include a pledge for an obligation in existence at
the time the pledge is given. If the pledgee is obligated to permit the
incurring of the debt by the pledgor, then a pledge given to secure the
future performance by the pledgor under the contract should also be
secured by the pledge when the item is delivered. This would explain
the imperative terms of the phrase "advances to be made."
In summary, if the pledgee need not resort to article 3158's provisions
relative to the retrospective effect of future obligations he should be
secured, but if he asserts that his pledge should be given retrospective
effect because of the article to a time before the obligation in question
was incurred he must point to some other obligation that was secured
17. La. Civ. Code arts. 3152, 3162.
18. The property may be returned temporarily to the pledgor without extinction of
the pledge. Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. New Orleans T & M Ry., 161
La. 1051, 109 So. 834 (1926); Scott v. Corken, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956). The
property may be "subpledged" by the pledgee and delivered to another without extinction
of the pledge. Meyer v. Moss, 110 La. 132, 34 So. 332 (1902). The parties may agree a
third person shall hold the property. La. Civ. Code art. 3162; Wells v. Dean, 211 La.
132, 29 So. 2d 590 (1947). See also infra note 26.
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by the pledge at the time he claims the pledge was effective. He must
also prove that he has held the property in pledge since then and that
when the earlier pledge was made it was "provided" or "desired," i.e.
agreed, that the future obligation would be also secured, should it arise.
Once the pledge is effective, however, the rights of an assignee or
transferee of either the debt or pledged property should be determined
on the basis of the general principles of pledge. The restrospective
provisions of the article apply to the pledge of all movables. They clearly
must be interpreted in light of the rest of the law of pledge. Article
3158 does not directly regulate the priority of a collateral mortgage by
rules unique to it. The mortgage question arises only because of the
holding that its efficacy is derivatively dependent upon the note it secures
being issued and continuously held in pledge.' 9
If a principal obligation is sold, assigned, or transferred, the law
provides the security given for it is also transferred. 20 This gives rise,
however, to additional considerations that are frequently ]resent in cases
involving pledges given to secure future obligations that are sometimes
overlooked.
When a pledge is given to secure an existing obligation and future
ones as well, the extinction of the first obligation does not prevent the
pledge from coming into effect as to the later ones. Assuming in such
a case that the pledge itself has not been extinguished, but that the
debt is merely paid (even by a third person), a subsequent advance by
the pledgee would have retroactive effect to the date of the first debt
according to the terms of article 3158.
Suppose in such a case, however, the first debt is assigned rather
than being paid, and a later advance is made by the original pledgee.
Absent an express or implied agreement by the pledgee restricting or
limiting the agreement of pledge with the pledgor, the later advance
should also be secured by the pledge although the priority of the rights
of the original pledgee vis-a-vis those of the transferee are not entirely
certain. 2' There appears to be no reason, however, why the pledge is
not valid as to both debts. Neither should there be any question as to
19. First Guar. Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978); Rex Fin. Co. v. Cary,
244 La. 675, 154 So. 2d 360 (1963); American Bank & Trust Co. v. F & W Constr.,
Inc., 357 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1978);
Wallace v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 219 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 253
La. 1083, 221 So. 2d 517 (1969).
20. La. Civil Code art. 2645.
21. The rule in the case of mortgages is that where a mortgage secures several debts,
each shares pro rata in the proceeds upon execution. When the origihal mortgagee assigns
one of several secured obligations there is an implied agreement that he will not compete
with his assignee. This is viewed as a personal obligation arising out of the assignment
and is thus not binding upon subsequent assignees of the other debts. See Leonard v.
Brooks, 158 La. 1032, 105 So. 54 (1925). The same rules would appear to be applicable
to the assignment of obligations secured by a pledge.
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the validity of the pledge as to either, whether or not the pledged
property is physically delivered to the assignee. In fact one may question
whether or not the pledgee is ever authorized to physically deliver the
pledged property to an assignee of the principal obligation. 22
In summary, the writer would suggest that where a pledgor agrees
a pledge will secure several debts, including those to arise in the future,
any or all of the existing debts may be paid without affecting the validity
of the pledge as to others then existing or thereafter arising; one or all
of the debts may be assigned or sold with no effect on the pledge either
as to the debt assigned or the others; the pledge itself may be released
22. If the pledgee assigns the principal obligation and delivers the pledged property
to the assignee, it would not appear that the original pledgee would be relieved of his
responsibility to the pledgor if the assignee absconds with or fails to preserve the property,
unless one concludes that the obligations of the pledgee are truly "real" ones that are
extinguished as to the pledgee when the right to the possession is divested by transfer of
the principal obligation. There appears to be no Louisiana case directly on the subject.
The French law recognizes that the pledgee's obligations are personal, not real. See 3 H.
Mazeaud & J. Mazeaud, Lecons de Droit Civil no. 82 (5th ed. 1977), where the contract
of pledge is noted as being an "imperfect synallagmatic one" because, although creating
a real right in the pledgee it also imposes upon him the obligation to preserve and restore
the thing. Louisiana Civil Code article 3162 recognizes that the pledged property may be
placed in the hands of a third person who is bound to the pledgor and pledgee to hold
it under the pledge. The writer suggests that the code thus recognizes that the detention
of the item, as distinguished from the rights given the pledgee by the contract of pledge,
may be separated. Where the pledgee agrees to hold the property of the pledgor, he
should, upon assignment of the debt, be likened unto one who is now holding the property
for the assignee but who is also the person "chosen by the parties" to do so. His
responsiblity to the pledgor for its safe keeping should continue. If this is true, absent
some agreement to the contrary he should be entitled to retain the property in his hands,
but would at the same time be holding it for the assignee of the principal obligation to
whom he has inferentially assigned his rights as pledgee. The principles involved are well
summarized by the court in In re Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 410, 416 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1956) as follows:
In Conger v. City of New Orleans, 1880, 32 La. Ann. 1250, 1252, the supreme
court said:
"Possession, though essential to the validity of the pledge, need not be always
in the creditor. It is sufficient that the thing pledged be in the possession of
one occupying ad hoc, the position of a trustee. The debtor himself may, in
some cases, be considered as such trustee and be given possession of the thing
by him pledged, provided his tenure be precarious and clearly for account of
the creditor. The Louisiana doctrine is in perfect accord with both the common,
the Roman and French laws" . . . .
It is clear that possession for the pledgee by a third party is equivalent to
the possession of the thing by the pledgee. See Wells v. Dean, 1947, 211 La.
132, 29 So. 2d 590. . . . (Citations omitted).
The pledgee who has assigned the principal obligation and thus, with it, his rights to the
pledge, certainly has, to use the expression of the court in the Conger case, "ad hoc the
position of trustee" to his assignee. If he should release the property to the pledgor
without the assignee's consent, is he not liable to the latter? If he fails to return it to
the pledgor upon satisfaction of the debt, is he not responsible to the pledgor?
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or remitted by the surrender of all or part of the property, extinguishing
the pledge as to the property released; or any combination of these
events may occur, depending upon the agreement of the parties.
This leaves one remaining question. May the pledgee assign not only
the principal obligation but his rights under the agreement with the
debtor that future advances will be secured by the pledge and thus
permit the assignee to make those advances and maintain the secured
position the transferor would have had if he had made them?
This question was presented for the first time in Texas Bank of
Beaumont v. Bozorg.23 The defendant pledged a collateral mortgage note
to the First National Bank of Jefferson Parish. The terms of the pledge
do not clearly appear from the opinion. The bank, in reliance upon
the pledge, made loans to the defendants taking several notes for them.
Later, a second mortgage was executed by the defendant securing a
collateral mortgage note that was pledged to Massey Ferguson (the
Intervenor) to secure amounts owed to it. The First National Bank then
delivered the collateral mortgage notes, the "hand" note and the col-
lateral mortgage to the plaintiff bank. The plaintiff then "refinanced"
the "hand" notes it had acquired from the First National Bank and
also advanced additional sums to the defendants. The court had little
difficulty with the first question presented-whether or not the assign-
ment of the principal obligation and the collateral mortgage note trans-
ferred the rights to the collateral mortgage to the plaintiff bank and
maintained its security as against the intervenor. The court relied upon
Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc. 24 and later cases by the circuit courts
of appeal 25 indicating that an assignment of the principal obligation
carries with it the security of the mortgage. It distinguished the case
before it from one such as the Lee case discussed above, where the
principal obligation is paid, and the pledge is also extinguished by the
surrender of the property with a new pledge being thereafter effected
by the pledgor in favor of another creditor.
A literal interpretation of article 3158 was advanced by the intervenor
in support of its contention that the transfer of the collateral mortgage
note extinguished the pledge since the pledged property had not "re-
mained in the hands of the pledgee." This argument seemingly over-
looked the fact that Civil Code article 3162 has always provided that
"in no case does this privilege [of the pledgee] subsist except when the
thing pledged . . . has actually . . . remained in possession of the
creditor . . . " As previously mentioned, this article has been construed
only to require a continued right of possession in the pledgee or assignee
of the principal obligation-not to require corporeal detention of the
23. 444 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'd in part, 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984).
24. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 167 So. 2d 677 (La. 1964).
25. Mardis v. Hollanger, 426 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Richey v. Venture
Oil & Gas Corp., 346 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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thing in the hands of the original pledgee. 26 There is no reason to believe
the language of article 3158 was intended to establish a different rule.
If the thing pledged is unconditionally surrendered to the pledgor, the
pledge is extinguished. Its subsequent redelivery in pledge obviously
creates a new pledge. The transfer of the principal obligation and the
implicit assignment of the security held for it, however, does not mean
that the pledged property is not still in the "hands of the creditor"
since the assignee is now the creditor and is, moreover, the assignee of
the original creditor's rights. The court also held that the "refinancing"
of the notes transferred by the first pledgee was not a novation-so
that the security held for them was preserved.
The more difficult question alluded to above was also presented-
whether the security enjoyed for the new advances made by the assignee
was entitled to be given the same retrospective effect it would have had
in the hands of the assignor. A majority of the court concluded it did.
In doing so, however, they seemed to assume, without expressly ad-
dressing the problem, that the mere possession of the collateral note as
security for a loan made to the original pledgor of necessity gave its
assignee a pledge for other obligations owed to it by the pledgor. The
majority thus held that advances made after the transfer by the assignee
to the pledgor were also secured retrospectively to the date of the first
pledge.
The facts do not clearly reflect the nature of the arrangement between
the three parties-the original bank, the borrower and the second bank-
nor the precise terms of the pledge to the first bank. The opinion does
suggest the borrower was "moving his business" to the second bank
that was succeeding to all of the rights and obligations of the first.
Thus, an officer of the first bank testified the plaintiff bank was to
buy the first bank's "collateral position."
Two judges dissented on the grounds that the refinancing of the
existing notes and the later advances were "new obligations" extended
by a new creditor and must necessarily rank under article 3158 only
from the time such loans were made. The contrary result constituted,
in the terms of one of the judges, "an unwarranted extension" of the
provisions of article 3158.
It appears neither the majority nor minority of the court recognized
the basic question presented. Both appear to have assumed that there
is some sort of necessary legal relationship between the possession of
a collateral mortgage note and the other obligations of its maker to the
possessor that is prescribed by article 3158. Neither the majority or
minority considered whether a pledge agreement existed, what its terms
were, or whether any attempted assignment of the original pledgee's
26. See cases cited supra note 18.
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rights could be (or was in fact) made. Although they arrived at different
conclusions, both the majority and the minority discussed the issue as
simply being whether possession of the collateral mortgage note invoked
the provisions of article 3158. Writs were granted in the case by the
supreme court. 27 The case is still pending. It is therefore perhaps pre-
mature to comment on the issue further.
PRIVATEs WORKS ACT
Con-Plex Division of U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Vicon, Inc.2 8 raised
the question of the validity of a clause in a surety bond given by a
subcontractor of a construction project to the principal contractor to
guarantee the former's performance. The clause provided, "Any suit
under this bond must be instituted before the expiration of two years
from date on which final payment under the subcontract falls due." '29
The argument was made that this was an attempt to modify the statutory
term of prescription, contrary to public policy. The court held that the
clause was valid, relying upon Landis & Young v. Gossett & Winn3°
and Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co." which held that while
parties cannot waive prescription in advance or agree to a longer period
they are free to stipulate a shorter period than that provided by law.
Article 3471 now expressly provides that parties may not agree to
specify a longer period of prescription nor make the requirements es-
tablished for it more onerous. The comments of the Law Institute to
that article also state that parties may agree to shorten the period if
they so desire and confirm the correctness of the opinion. 2 It should
also be noted, perhaps, that the suretyship in question was not one
given for a general contractor to an owner that is regulated by the
private works act. That act now provides that such a bond "shall be
deemed to conform to the requirements of this part notwithstanding
any provision of the bond to the contrary . . ."" and would render
such a clause invalid in the case of such a bond.
OIL, GAS AND WATER WELL LIEN ACT
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4861-4867 (commonly called the oil,
gas and water well lien act) gives a privilege to certain suppliers of
material, labor or services utilized in the drilling of an oil and gas or
27. 444 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'd in part, 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984).
28. 448 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
29. 448 So. 2d at 192.
30. 178 So. 760 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
31. 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
32. La. Civ. Code art. 3471, comment (b) (Supp. 1983).
33. La. R.S. 9:4812(D) (1983).
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water well over the oil and gas produced from the well; the lease
"whereon the well is located" and all "drilling rigs, standard rigs,
machinery, appurtances, appliances, equipment, buildings, tanks and
other structures thereto attached or located on the lease." '3 4 Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:4862 provides that the privileges are second in rank
to all other privileges except taxes "or a bona fide vendors privilege,
or privileges filed or recorded prior to the date on which the first labor,
service . ..materials or supplies covered by the privilege is furnished."
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4864 then provides: "As to movable prop-
erty the vendor's privileges must exist and be filed for record within
seven days after the property subject to the privilege is delivered to the
well or wells . . . .The effect of such filing shall prevent the movables
from becoming immovables by nature or destination."
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced, in In
re Martin Exploration Co.,3 with the task of construing these provisions
to the case of one who had sold pipe to a lessee drilling a well. The
pipe was never incorporated into the well-a fact apparently brought
about by the bankruptcy of the lessee. The seller did not record the
evidence of the sale as required by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4864
quoted above. A company having a privilege under the statute claimed
that the privilege was superior to the vendor's privilege of the seller of
the pipe because of the latter's failure to make the filing required by
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4864. The court, recognizing that Louisiana
law ordinarily does not require (or provide for) recordation of a vendor's
privilege on movables and noting an absence of any language in the
act generally purporting to extinguish the privilege in the absence of
such filing, concluded that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4864 was not
designed to limit or restrict the rights of the vendor by requiring him
to file evidence of his privilege to preserve it, but rather to expand
them by permitting him to maintain his privilege in cases where it would
otherwise be divested by the incorporation of the movables into an
immovable. The court rejected as erroneous dicta a statement of the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal to the contrary in an earlier
case.3 6 Although the matter is by no means clear, and a persuasive
argument can be made for the other position, on balance the interpre-
tation of the court in light of the express provisions of the section as
to its "effect" appears to be the most reasonable one.
34. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1983).
35. 731 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1984).
36. Pertuit v. Angelloz, 164 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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